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FDIC v. COLEMAN AND THE DUTY OF
GOOD FAITH: LET THE BORROWERS
BEWARE OR LET THEM EAT
ACREAGE?
by Harold L. Levy
N or about December 8, 1981, Judico Enterprises, Inc. gave its one-
year $460,000 promissory note to the First National Bank of Mid-
land in Midland, Texas. Willie R. Coleman and W. Dwayne Pow-
ell, officers and controlling principals in Judico, guaranteed payment of the
note' secured by a deed of trust lien on real property. Powell arranged the
note and guaranties 2 and executed the note and deed of trust for Judico.
On October 26, 1982, Judico filed for protection from its creditors under
chapter eleven of the federal bankruptcy code.3 Six months later, the Mid-
land bank filed suit against Coleman and Powell as guarantors, then moved
in the bankruptcy court to foreclose its lien on the underlying real property.
Shortly thereafter, the bank became insolvent, and on October 14, 1983, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)4 assumed control of the
1. A guarantor promises to pay any unpaid amount due under the specific terms of a
matured instrument without requiring the holder of the instrument to pursue any other party
for payment. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.416(a) (Vernon 1968).
A note is a distinct and separate commitment from a guaranty of payment such that the
guarantor may be sued separately from the maker. Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 551 S.W.2d
343, 345 (Tex. 1977). A guarantor assumes primary liability for payment; the holder of a note
need not sue the maker as a condition precedent to hold the guarantor liable. Id.
2. The guaranties stated in part:
Guarantors expressly waive diligence on the part of the said Creditor in the
collection of any and all [of Judico's indebtedness].... The Creditor shall not be
required to pursue any other remedies before invoking the benefits of this guar-
anty, especially it shall not be required to exhaust its remedies against endorsers,
collateral and other security.... [S]hould the Debtor execute in favor of said
Creditor any collateral agreement, the exercise by the Creditor of any right con-
ferred upon it in said agreement shall be wholly discretionary with the Creditor,
and such exercise of, or failure to exercise, such right shall in no wise impair or
diminish the obligations of the Guarantors hereunder.
FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 557, 557-58 (June 13, 1990).
3. In general, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1988) provides for the reorganization of a finan-
cially troubled debtor in order to avoid foreclosure on the debtor's property by creditors, pre-
vent liquidation of the debtor, and discharge debt owed to creditors.
4. As a governmental agency, the FDIC insures deposits in national banks and state
chartered banks; when an insured bank fails, FDIC regulators temporarily assume its manage-
ment. See generally Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Frame-
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bank. As the bank's receiver, the FDIC purchased the note and its security.5
Ten months later, on August 15, 1984, the bankruptcy court entered an
agreed order permitting the FDIC to foreclose on the property securing the
note.
On June 7, 1985, the FDIC's foreclosure sale of the property for $357,000
left a balance due on the note of approximately $486,000.6 The FDIC then
brought suit against Coleman and Powell for the deficiency. The guarantors
argued that the FDIC had breached its duty to act in good faith in its protec-
tion of the collateral, by delaying the foreclosure and sale of the property
during a period when the property's market value declined. 7
The FDIC moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted its
motion.8 The court of appeals in El Paso reversed the judgment and re-
manded the cause for trial. The El Paso court agreed with the guarantors
that the duty of good faith arose in the case and presented a material ques-
tion of fact regarding a possible breach of such duty.9 The Texas Supreme
Court granted the FDIC's writ of error to review the case. 10 Held, for the
FDIC, reversing the judgment of the court of appeals and affirming the judg-
ment of the trial court: A secured creditor's failure to foreclose its lien
promptly after the debtor's default on the note is not a breach of any duty of
good faith and fair dealing. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 557 (June
13, 1990).
I. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
A. In General
The Texas Supreme Court has refused to impose a covenant of good faith
work, 40 Sw. L.J. 775, 804-05 & nn. 170-72 (1986) (historical background of the FDIC and its
development).
Texas real estate values declined severely during the past decade, which resulted in negative
effects on the state and national banking and savings and loan industries. See The Dallas
Morning News, July 27, 1990, at 2D, col. 2 (discussing the decline in real estate since the
1980s, the golden age of the industry). The city of Midland sits in west Texas, once a booming
center of oil and gas production. The west Texas region also declined economically during the
past decade and impacted the overall Texas economy. See The Dallas Morning News, July 28,
1990, at IF, col. 4 (discussing the severe decline in Texas oil and gas production and revenues
since the early 1980s).
5. Coleman v. FDIC, 762 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988), rev'd, 33 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 557 (June 13, 1990).
6. Neither the supreme court opinion in FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 557-58,
nor the appeals court opinion in Coleman v. FDIC, 762 S.W.2d at 243-44 detailed the calcula-
tion of the balance due, but apparently it included accrued interest from December 8, 1981.
The trial court rendered judgment against the guarantors for only $450,475.42, an amount less
than the deficiency established by the FDIC's summary judgment evidence. FDIC v. Cole-
man, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 558 n. I. The supreme court noted that the FDIC nonsuited its
claim for attorney fees. Id.
7. Over a period of one year, the various appraised values of the property ranged as
follows: March 30, 1984 - $550,000; May 1, 1984 - $568,000; January 28, 1985 -
$450,000; March 6, 1985 - $390,000. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 559 n.2.
8. Id. at 557, 558.
9. Coleman v. FDIC, 762 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988), rev'd, 33 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 557 (June 13, 1990).
10. FDIC v. Coleman, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 343 (April 26, 1989).
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and fair dealing into the business affairs of its citizens, rejecting the theory of
law that in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party will
do anything which injures the right of the other party to receive the benefits
of the agreement.11 Furthermore, Texas courts will not impose an implied
covenant on a party regarding a matter specifically addressed by the con-
tract. 12 Additionally, courts will not alter the agreement of the parties found
in the contract itself by an implied good faith and fair dealing covenant.13
Instead, Texas courts have read a duty of good faith and fair dealing into
many types of contractually-based transactions by finding a special relation-
ship between the parties to the contract. 14 The special relationship arises
either from the element of trust necessary to accomplish the ends of the
contract or an imbalance of bargaining power among the contracting par-
ties.15 Texas public policy requires that courts must recognize this duty of
good faith and fair dealing which springs from such a special relationship. 16
Due to the special relationship arising out of the parties' unequal bargaining
power and the one-sided nature of insurance contracts, Texas courts have
found a duty of good faith and fair dealing between an insurance company
and its insured customer.17 Finally, because breaches of a covenant are con-
11. See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983), rev'd, 649 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.
App.--Corpus Christi 1982). In this dispute between a mortgagor and a mortgagee over the
disposition of fire insurance proceeds, the court of appeals, citing two California appellate
cases, discussed the implied covenant theory that the supreme court subsequently rejected.
English v. Fischer, 649 S.W.2d at 89. See also Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex.
1984) (fiduciary duty in a mineral co-tenancy arises from the parties' relationship, not from the
contract).
In the Texas Supreme Court opinion in English, Justice Kilgarlin dissented, citing the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979), "Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." English,
660 S.W.2d at 525. Observing the firm establishment of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in American law, he concluded Texas should adopt the modern and majority view
by implying such a covenant under Texas law. Id. at 527-28. One commentator suggested
that Justice Kilgarlin's dissent in English might represent the majority opinion if the supreme
court decided the case today. See Tyler, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability in Texas, 24
Hous. L. REV. 411, 422 (1987).
12. Exxon Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 678 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. 1984) (where all
parties to a series of contracts governing production of oil and gas agreed to a termination
clause which expressly and unambiguously set out the terms for termination of the contracts,
no implied covenant to the contrary could vary the agreement to defeat the termination).
13 Id. (citing English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d at 522).
14. English, 660 S.W.2d at 524 (Spears, J., concurring).
15. Id
16. Id at 525.
17. See Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212-13 (Tex. 1988) (work-
ers' compensation carriers have duty to deal fairly and in good faith when processing the
compensation claims of injured employees); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (insurance company held to "that degree of care and dili-
gence which a man of ordinary care and prudence would exercise in the management of his
own business") (quoting G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544,
548 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved)). But cf Lovell v. Western Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 754 S.W.2d 298, 302-03 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied) (no implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing where life insurance company held assigned indebtedness of bor-
rower; court found neither an element of trust between mortgagor and mortgagee nor an im-
balance of bargaining power to create a special relationship); Cantu v. Western Fire and
Casualty Ins. Co., 716 S.W.2d 737, 739-40 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986), writ ref'd, 723
S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam) (no evidence of an explicit covenant to act in good faith
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tractual in nature, the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is not
a breach of contract, but of a legal duty.18
The Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Texas, imposes an obliga-
tion of good faith in the performance of every contract or duty within the
Code. 19 "Good faith" demands honesty in fact in a party's actions or deal-
ings.20 The standard for good faith relies upon the concerned party's actual
beliefs, and not the reasonableness of that party's belief.21 The test does not
utilize a diligence or negligence standard.22
B. Lending Cases
Texas law does not impose a general fiduciary obligation between a lender
and a borrower or between business parties.23 Prior to 1988, no Texas court
had ruled directly on the existence of a fiduciary relationship between a
mortgagor and a mortgagee. 24 Under Texas case law, however, a trustee of a
in property insurance claim; supreme court did not approve appellate court language regarding
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, but found no reversible error in denying the application
for writ of error).
18. Chitsey v. National Lloyds Ins. Co., 738 S.W.2d 641, 643 n.l (Tex. 1987).
19. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Vernon 1968).
20. Id. at § 1.201(19). Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals with general
provisions of the Code, while Article 2 deals with sales law. "'Good faith' in the case of a
merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." Id. at § 2.103(a)(2). Throughout the FDIC v. Coleman opinion, the
Texas Supreme Court refers to both a "duty of good faith and fair dealing" and a "duty of
good faith." The opinion, however, specifically and appropriately refers to § 1.201(19) for its
definition of the duty of good faith since a loan, not a sale, constituted the underlying transac-
tion at issue.
21. La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1984) (citing Riley
v. First State Bank, 469 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
22. Quanah, A. & P. Ry. v. Wichita State Bank & Trust Co., 127 Tex. 407, 93 S.W.2d
701, 704 (1936); First State Bank & Trust Co. v. George, 519 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Tex. Civ.
App.--Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Richardson Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d
812, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Riley v. First State Bank, 469 S.W.2d
812, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. In Re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1986) (bank
which financed participation interests in oil and gas leases held by its customer had no fiduci-
ary duty to the lease investors). But cf TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.208 (Vernon 1968)(an insecure creditor or his successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance, or
require collateral or additional collateral, only with a good faith belief in the impairment of the
prospect of payment or performance). See, e.g., Jack M. Finley, Inc. v. Longview Bank &
Trust Co., 705 S.W.2d 206, 208-09 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (uncontro-
verted evidence that promisor had threatened bankruptcy sufficently established bank's good
faith in accelerating promissory note); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Powers, 613 S.W.2d 30, 34(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (courts must determine good faith acceleration
on a case by case analysis, after the occurrence of acceleration); Sparkman v. Peoples Nat'l
Bank, 580 S.W.2d 868, 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (borrower did
not establish lender's lack of good faith so as to overcome summary judgment on the issue).
Cf First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226, 1229-30 (1984) (Montana
bank breached its statutory obligation under UCC § 1-208 to exercise good faith in dealings
with borrower).
24. Lovell v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 298, 303 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1988, writ denied) (no special relationship exists between mortgagor and mortgagee). The
Amarillo court noted that "although the relationship between a mortgagor and a mortgagee
was often described as one of trust, technically it was not a fiduciary relationship." Id. The
Amarillo court decided Lovell before the El Paso court of appeals decision in Coleman v.
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deed of trust becomes a special agent for both the mortgagor and the mort-
gagee. 25 The trustee in the deed of trust has a separate capacity and a partic-
ular responsibility to act with total, unbiased neutrality and fairness to the
grantor in performing his appointed powers under the deed of trust.
26
A mortgagee has an obligation to conduct a foreclosure sale fairly and not
to deter bidding by action or comments made prior to or during the sale.
27
Texas courts consider the mortgagee's goals to be immaterial; the mortgagee
is judged by the actual results.28 Thus, a sale properly executed by the mort-
gagee will sustain an attack based on inadequacy of the sale price.
29
In general, only the mortgagor or a party in privity with the mortgagor
can challenge the validity of a foreclosure sale under the deed of trust.30 A
guarantor, who is in broad terms a type of surety, 31 possesses a beneficial
interest in the property held by the creditor as security for the debt.32 The
creditor must abide by a standard of good faith in maintenance and disposi-
tion of the collateral and its sale proceeds, both for the sake of the collateral
FDIC, 762 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988) (duty of good faith exists between
mortgagor and mortgagee), rev'd on same grounds, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 557 (June 13, 1990).
25. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. 1962) (citing
Hampshire v. Greeves, 104 Tex. 620, 143 S.W. 147, 151 (1912); Zeiss v. First State Bank, 189
S.W. 524, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1916, writ ref'd)).
26. Hammonds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. 1977) (citing First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Tex. 1962); Fuller v. O'Neal, 69 Tex. 349, 6 S.W.
181, 181-82 (1887)).
27. Biddle v. National Old Line Ins. Co., 513 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. Id
29. Id (citing Jones v. Pratt, 77 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 887, 888 (1890) (alleged irregularities
regarding the foreclosure sale must be proved in order to set aside the sale); Tarrant Say. Ass'n
v. Lucky Homes, Inc., 390 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex. 1965) (inadequacy of sales price will not
invalidate a foreclosure sale if the sale was properly held)). Accord Savers Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d 1497, 1503 (5th Cir. 1989) (inadequacy of sales price received will not
invalidate a real estate foreclosure; invalidation also requires some impropriety in foreclosure
which led to an extremely insufficient price); Greater S.W. Office Park, Ltd. v. Texas Com-
merce Bank Nat'l Ass'n 786 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, n.w.h.)
(inadequacy of price will not rescind a trustee's sale, absent impropriety in the transaction
leading to the inadequate price for the property).
But cf. Olney Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Farmers Market, 764 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1989, writ denied) (lender's bid price at foreclosure sale must be "fair and reasonable");
Halter v. Allied Merchants Bank, 751 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ
denied) (court noted in dictum that if evidence in deficiency action indicated that lender
purchased collateral at foreclosure sale for grossly inadequate price, then the evidence
presented a question of fact regarding lender's right to any deficiency after foreclosure); Lee v.
Sabine Bank, 708 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court noted
in dictum that creditor with secured collateral has a trust arrangement with debtor such that
in a foreclosure sale lender must make legitimate effort to decrease debt by obtaining a just
price for the security).
30. Goswami v. Metropolitan Say. & Loan Ass'n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. 1988) (citing
Estelle v. Hart, 55 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, opinion adopted); Mercer v.
Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693, 698 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). A
third party, however, possesses the necessary standing to challenge a foreclosure sale when
such third party has either a legal or equitable property interest that will be affected by the
sale. Goswami, 751 S.W.2d at 489 (citing American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d
581, 586 (Tex. 1975); Estelle v. Hart, 55 S.W.2d at 513).
31. A surety is one who contractually agrees to answer for the debt of another party, the
surety's principal. Crimmins v. Lowry, 691 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. 1985).
32. Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 1967).
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itself and in deference to the guarantor's responsibility.33 The terms of the
contract establish the guarantors' rights. a4 A guarantor, however, faces a
problem when asserting his rights against a lender because Texas courts do
not consider a guarantor to be a party to the guaranteed note.a5 Further-
more, a guaranty is not an "instrument" under the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code.36
II. FDIC v. COLEMAN
A. Majority Opinion and Reasoning
As guarantors, Coleman and Powell contended that a secured creditor
owes a duty of good faith to a guarantor of the indebtedness. 37 This duty
would require the creditor to liquidate the security promptly after the
debtor's default in order to lessen the guarantor's liability for any defi-
ciency.38 Coleman and Powell argued that the duty of good faith arose from
three sources, which the majority, in its five to three opinion, 39 examined
and dismissed in turn.4°
Addressing the first source, section 1.203 of the Texas Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC),4' the court questioned whether the statute would treat a
guaranty agreement, executed separately and apart from a promissory note
secured by a lien on real property, as a contract subject to the good faith
standard.42 Furthermore, even if the UCC provision applied to the guaran-
33. Id.
34. Mid-States Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Bank of Tex., 450 S.W.2d 428,431 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Roseborough v. Phillips, 389 S.W.2d 593,
596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, no writ)). The court noted that it must give consideration
to all of the terms of the contract of guaranty, if possible. Id.
35. Simpson v. MBank Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (purchaser of interest in a corporation, who guaranteed the corporation's previ-
ously funded debts, was not a party to such corporation's debts, even after the lender consoli-
dated the debts into a single note). But cf United States v. Vahlco Corp., 800 F.2d 462, 465
(5th Cir. 1986) (under Texas law, a guaranty agreement is strictly construed in the guarantor's
favor; thus, any modification to the underlying debt discharges the guarantor's obligation be-
cause it alters the terms of the debt and unfairly modifies the risks assumed by the guarantor).
36. "'Instrument' means a negotiable instrument." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.102(a)(5) (Vernon 1968). In summary, the statute provides that for a writing to be a nego-
tiable instrument within the UCC, the maker must sign the writing; the writing must include
an unconditional promise to pay a specified amount of money; the writing must be payable on
demand or at a fixed time; and the writing must be payable to order or to bearer. Id
§ 3.104(a). Accord Simpson v. MBank Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d at 105 (guarantor is not a
party to guaranteed debt and guaranty is not an instrument under the UCC).
37. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 557, 558 (June 13, 1990).
38. Id.
39. Justice Doggett did not participate in the decision. Id. at 560.
40. Id.
41. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
42. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 558 (citing FDIC v. Attayi, 745 S.W.2d 939,
948 ('rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (guaranty of a promissory note secured by
real property may differ from guaranty of a promissory note secured by personal property);
Simpson v. MBank Dallas, N.A., 724 S.W.2d 102, 105-06 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (guaranty is a contract, not an instrument); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 111 Wis.
2d 26, 330 N.W.2d 201, 207-09 (1983) (guaranty given detached from and unconnected to an
instrument is not within the UCC)).
ties at issue, the definition of good faith, "honesty in fact," would not sustain
the guarantors' position because the guarantors complained not of the
FDIC's dishonesty, but of the FDIC's lack of diligence.43 The UCC does
not demand diligence in its test for good faith.44
The second source of the duty of good faith, state common law, hinged on
the presence or absence of either a special relationship marked by shared
trust or an imbalance in bargaining power.45 The court found that neither a
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, nor a creditor-guarantor relationship,
gave rise to a duty of good faith.46 The supreme court denied this second
argument, noting that Coleman and Powell did not even assert the existence
of a special relationship leading to a recognized duty of good faith and fair
dealing.47
Finally, the guarantors cited Frederick v. United States48 to argue that
federal common law imposed a duty of good faith on the FDIC.4 9 Disagree-
ing with this argument, the supreme court found that Frederick dealt with
the misapplication of collateralized security, whereas Coleman and Powell
complained of the FDIC's complacency in foreclosing its lien.50 Further-
more, the court stated that a guarantor could not direct the creditor to pur-
sue the collateral when a debtor defaulted.51
Besides the lack of case law to support the guarantors' position, the
supreme court found other reasons to deny the claim that the creditor owed
a duty of good faith in a foreclosure.52 The court noted that Coleman and
Powell could have protected themselves from exposure to greater liability on
their guaranties resulting from a declining real estate market. s3 Further-
more, Coleman and Powell could not force the bank and the FDIC to pro-
43. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 559 (citing First State Bank & Trust Co. v.
George, 519 S.W.2d 198, 203 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rich-
ardson Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Riley v. First State Bank, 469 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
44. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 559. See supra notes 19-22 and accompany-
ing text.
45. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 559. The court cited four cases for the test of
special relationship or imbalance of bargaining power: Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
748 S.W.2d 210, 212-13 (Tex. 1988); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725
S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987); Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Tex. 1984); and English
v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524-25 (Tex. 1983) (Spears, J., concurring). FDIC v. Coleman, 33
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 559.
46. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 559.
47. Id
48. 386 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1967). The Fifth Circuit in Frederick cited only two cases for
its good faith theory: a 1914 decision from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding a
diversity action under Louisiana law, and an 1897 decision from the Alabama Supreme Court.
Id. at 486-87. Therefore, it seems odd that the Texas Supreme Court in FDIC v. Coleman
referred to the Frederick decision as a source of federal common law.
49. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 559.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 1967)).
52. Id
53. Id The court suggested that Coleman and Powell could have purchased the property
from Judico, paid the debt (if possible), then retained any future profit. Id.
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tect their interests, as guarantors. 54 The court then noted the impossible
burden placed on the creditor.55 Recalling the increase in the secured real
property's value during 1984,56 the court reasoned that requiring a lender to
accelerate liquidation of collateral in a falling market would logically require
the lender to delay liquidation in a rising market. 5"
The court also found the guarantors' express waiver of any duty of good
faith within the guaranties themselves. 58 Because the waivers relieved the
creditor from looking to the security to satisfy the debt, the FDIC as succes-
sor in interest could proceed directly against the guarantors for the full lia-
bility.5 9 The court ruled that the FDIC's freedom to foreclose on the
property at will necessarily included the right to decide when to foreclose on
the property.60 Finally, the court addressed the procedural problems cre-
ated by recognizing a duty of good faith. Imposing the duty on a creditor
for the benefit of the guarantor and presumably, the debtor, would raise a
question of fact in virtually every dispute on this issue, preclude the use of
summary judgment, and require a full trial on the merits.6 1 As the court
noted, "commercial transactions require more predictability and certainty"
than a duty of good faith would contemplate.62
The majority's final discussion centered on the applicability of Texas law
concerning impairment of recourse or of collateral.63 In relevant part, the
statute provides for the holder's discharge of any party to an instrument to
the extent that without such party's consent, the holder suspends the right to
enforce against such person the instrument or collateral. 64 An express reser-
vation of rights by the holder negates this defense to the party.65 The court
reiterated its points that the guaranties were not negotiable instruments and
that the guarantors were not parties to Judico's note. 66 Rejecting the guar-
antors' impairment of collateral defense under the statute, the court found
that the terms of the guaranties allowed the creditor absolute discretion in
pursuing its interest in the security. 67
54. Id. The court reminded the guarantors of their right of subrogation against Judico,
the corporation which they principally controlled, if the guarantors paid Judico's debt to the
FDIC. Id. (citing Crimmins v. Lowry, 691 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. 1985) (describing the equi-
table duties and rights of a surety)).
55. Id. at 559-60.
56. See supra note 7.
57. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 560.
58. Id.; see supra note 2.
59. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 560.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. See also Ebke & Griffin, supra note 4, at 798 (conceptual nature of the duty of
good faith does not prescribe distinct parameters regarding the bounds of legally permissible
conduct).
63. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 560 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.606 (Vernon 1968)).
64. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606(a)(1) (Vernon 1968).
65. See id. § 3.606(b).




Justice Mauzy dissented, 68 focusing on three points: (1) commercial rea-
sonableness; (2) the remedies of a guarantor; and (3) the majority's finding
that the guarantors could protect themselves from greater exposure on their
guaranties. 69 First, Mauzy argued that by focusing on the imposition of a
duty of good faith, the majority failed to consider the true issue presented by
Coleman and Powell. 70 Mauzy contended that the guarantors pled a theory
of commercial reasonableness, 7' rather than the theory of good faith and fair
dealing recognized in insurance cases. 72 Citing the appellate court deci-
sion, 73 Justice Mauzy pointed out the FDIC's growing awareness of the de-
clining value of the property securing Judico's loan based on the FDIC's
response to interrogatories.7 4 In the same interrogatories, the FDIC admit-
ted that its loan credit manual recommended a grace period of four months
on a loan prior to foreclosure, lacking any extraordinary circumstances. 75
Although the FDIC took the property subject to the stay of bankruptcy on
October 4, 1983, it obtained an agreed order for relief from the stay on Au-
gust 15, 1984, but did not sell the property until June 7, 1985.76 Noting that
the guarantors' attorney had sent a letter to the FDIC on November 16,
1983, urging settlement of the lawsuit and quick foreclosure, Justice Mauzy
agreed with the appellate court that the case presented a material question of
fact regarding the existence of a duty of commercial reasonableness. 77
Justice Mauzy then observed that although the guaranty contract relieved
the creditor from proceeding against the collateral before exercising its rights
against the guarantors, 78 the FDIC proceeded against the real property after
obtaining the agreed order on August 15, 1984. 79 At that point, Mauzy
would impose on the FDIC a duty to act in a commercially reasonable
68. Id. at 561. Justices Spears and Ray joined in the dissenting opinion. Justice Spears,
who wrote the concurring opinion in English v. Fischer, noted that a special relationship be-
tween parties to a contract imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing upon the parties.
English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524-25 (Tex. 1983). See supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
69. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 560-61.
70. Id. at 560.
71. Id. (citing Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 486-87 (5th Cir. 1967) (negli-
gence or irregularity of creditor in selling security, which results in realization of less than the
security's full value, allows claim by guarantor against creditor for improper preservation or
application of collateral or relieves guarantor of his liability to the extent of collateral's value);
Mack Fin. Corp. v. Scott, 100 Idaho 889, 606 P.2d 993, 996 (1980) (creditor's disposition of
repossessed security after the debtor's default must be commercially reasonable)).
72. In particular, Justice Mauzy cited Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d
210, 212-13 (Tex. 1988); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. 1987). FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 560.
73. Coleman v. FDIC, 762 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988), rev'd, 33 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 557 (June 13, 1990).
74. FDIC v. Coleman, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 560-61.
75. Id. at 561.
76. Id
77. Id.
78. See supra note 2.




Finally, Justice Mauzy considered the majority's observation regarding
the guarantors' ability to protect themselves from increased liability due to a
decline in the collateral's market value.8' He would have instructed the
FDIC to pursue this matter and present it to a jury in determining the com-
mercial reasonableness issue.82
III. CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in FDIC v. Coleman traced lines of cases to affirm
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the FDIC and dismiss a fact
question regarding the breach of a duty of good faith or fair dealing in com-
mercial lending. The Texas Supreme Court held that no such duty existed,
and it found practical obstacles to imposing such an obligation on a lender.
The decision effectively held guarantors to a standard of conduct in loan
transactions, a standard requiring guarantors to faithfully honor their own
obligations. The decision may show debtors considering defaulting on their
loans that Texas courts will not release faltering debtors from their obliga-
tions. Yet, a trial on an appropriate dispute testing the commercial reasona-
bleness standard might also demonstrate that Texas will impose a legal
burden on commercial parties whose misconduct led to financial loss. Per-
haps a Texas court will consider this standard in the next lender liability
claim.
80. Id. (citing L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 75, at 382-83
(1950) (creditor's failure to use ordinary diligence discharges the surety to the extent that the
creditor's action causes unnecessary loss)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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